fix(security): normalize changed-file paths + recurse D20 lint into subpackages #93
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pdurlej/patchwarden!93
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Delete branch "claude/security-hardening-wave"
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What
Two defense-in-depth hardening fixes surfaced by the 2026-06-16 opportunity audit (security-governance finder). Both are M2-permitted (D21 defense hardening), stdlib-only, with regression tests.
1. Path-traversal bypass in
classify_files(pr_check.py)classify_filesmatched policy prefixes against raw paths viastartswith. A changed-files entry likedocs/../secrets/.envwouldstartswith("docs/")and classify assafe_docs_status(eligible_clean) instead ofsecrets— bypassing the manual gate.changed_files. So: real defense-in-depth gap, not a live RCE.posixpath.normpatheach path before classification → it's classified by its true target (docs/../secrets/.env→secrets/.env→secrets). Any path that escapes the repo root (absolute, or..after normalization) fails closed tounknown(a sensitive class).2. D20 boundary lint was flat (
test_d20_architectural_boundary.py)_src_module_pathsusedSRC_DIR.glob("*.py")— top-level only. A future subpackage (e.g.src/patchwarden/adapters/forgejo.py) calling a merge endpoint would slip past the build-time D20 check — the exact Swiss-Cheese gap the lint exists to close.rglob(recursive), parametrizedroot, plus a recursion self-test that proves a nestedmerge_pull_request(call is caught and__init__.pystays excluded.Tests
test_pr_check, 1 recursion intest_d20).PYTHONPATH=src python3 -m unittest discover tests).Deliberately NOT included (needs your design call — reported separately)
effective_cloud_review()is defined + unit-tested but never called in the livereview_run._findings_from_ollamadispatch path. A sensitive-classification PR could therefore have its diff sent to a cloud Ollama endpoint (OLLAMA_BASE_URL). The fix needs a design decision on the enforcement layer (review_run vs cli vs a dedicated guard), so I did not bundle a possibly-wrong-layer change here.From the 2026-06-16 opportunity audit. Do not merge — operator merge only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two defense-in-depth fixes from the 2026-06-16 opportunity audit (security-governance finder), both M2-permitted (D21 defense hardening), stdlib-only. 1. Path-traversal in classify_files (pr_check.py) classify_files matched prefixes against raw paths, so a changed-files entry like "docs/../secrets/.env" would startswith("docs/") and classify as safe_docs_status (eligible_clean) instead of secrets. git normalizes tree paths so this is not reachable via a normal Forgejo diff, but the offline metadata pipeline (#27) accepts hand-crafted changed_files where it is. Fix: posixpath.normpath each path before classification (so it is classified by its true target — "docs/../secrets/.env" -> "secrets/.env" -> secrets), and fail closed to "unknown" on any path that escapes the repo root (absolute, or ".." after normalization). 2. D20 boundary lint was flat (test_d20_architectural_boundary.py) _src_module_paths used SRC_DIR.glob("*.py") — top-level only. A future subpackage (e.g. src/patchwarden/adapters/forgejo.py) calling a merge endpoint would slip past the build-time D20 check. Fix: rglob, parametrized root, plus a recursion self-test proving a nested merge call is caught. Tests: +7 (6 path-traversal/normalization in test_pr_check, 1 recursion in test_d20). Full suite 303 green. NOT included (needs an operator design call, reported separately): effective_cloud_review is defined + unit-tested but never called in the live review_run dispatch path, so a sensitive-classification PR could have its diff sent to a cloud Ollama endpoint. The right enforcement layer (review_run vs cli vs a guard) is a design decision, not a drop-in fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>