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feat(openclaw): add zenbox wordpress mcp #391

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pdurlej merged 2 commits from codex/openclaw/zenbox-wordpress-mcp into main

2026-05-24 22:27:38 +02:00

codex commented

2026-05-19 10:01:31 +02:00

Collaborator

Canary status: missing - full 3+3 should run before merge because this touches modules/, compose, and a security-sensitive MCP surface.

Canary Context Pack

Product story

Iskra/OpenClaw needs a platform-managed MCP surface for Piotr's self-hosted WordPress and Zenbox hosting. The goal is read-all guidance for WordPress/plugin settings, draft operations, and bounded WP-CLI/SFTP inspection without handing Iskra arbitrary shell access or public exposure.

What changed

Adds scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/ as a self-contained Python MCP service with Dockerfile, tests, and runtime docs.
Adds zenbox-wordpress-mcp to compose/apps/compose.yaml as an internal-only integrations profile service.
Adds modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml, runbook, and module index entry.

Why it changed

The local MCP prototype is now ready to become a normal platform/OpenClaw component. Keeping it in platform makes the initial deployment self-contained while the separate zenbox-wordpress repo has no Forgejo remote yet.

Files touched

compose/apps/compose.yaml
modules/INDEX.yaml
modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/*
scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/*

Relevant context

Secrets expected from Infisical path /home-platform/apps/openclaw/zenbox-wordpress.
Runtime target is vps1000/OpenClaw, internal-only MCP, streamable HTTP on port 8000.
Zenbox SSH host key is fail-closed by default; runtime must seed known_hosts or intentionally set ZENBOX_SSH_ACCEPT_NEW_HOST_KEY=1 only for bootstrap.

Runtime evidence

No production runtime mutation performed.

Local verification:

tests/validate-schema.sh zenbox-wordpress-mcp -> PASS
PYTHONPATH=control-plane python3 -m platformctl.cli validate modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml -> ok true
uv sync --extra dev && uv run --project . python -m pytest in scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp -> 10 passed
uv run python -m zenbox_wordpress_mcp.server --healthcheck in copied MCP -> ok true, no secrets emitted
Python YAML parse/assertion for compose/apps zenbox-wordpress-mcp service slice -> OK

Not run:

Docker image build on Mac: Docker daemon/socket unavailable locally.
Full docker compose config --quiet for the entire large compose/apps/compose.yaml: existing repo-wide env gaps produce unrelated blank-label/proto errors before this new service can be isolated. New service slice was parsed and asserted directly.

Known constraints

This is security-sensitive because it introduces a private-assistant MCP surface with WordPress draft capability and Zenbox SSH/SFTP credentials.
Publishing and mutating WP-CLI remain disabled by default and require explicit runtime flags plus confirmation strings.
Read-all plugin/settings tools redact credential-like option values.

Explicit out-of-scope

No runtime deployment, no OpenClaw MCP registration change, no Infisical ACL mutation, no DNS/Substack/Yoast automation.
No creation of a separate Forgejo repo for zenbox-wordpress; codex has no admin permission to create pdurlej/zenbox-wordpress.

Requested decision

Review as Full/security-sensitive. If accepted, merge this as the platform-managed service definition, then deploy/register it in a separate operator-gated runtime step.

Merge blockers

Any raw secret in repo.
Any public/tailnet exposure without explicit operator decision.
Any unguarded publish/mutation path.
Docker build failure on a machine with a running Docker daemon.

Spec sources read

AGENTS.md instructions provided in-thread
docs/forgejo-agent-operations.md implied by Forgejo PR protocol from AGENTS
compose/apps/compose.yaml existing MCP/service patterns
modules/openclaw-searxng-mcp/module.yaml and runbook for vps1000/OpenClaw manifest pattern
modules/storage-ro-mcp/module.yaml and runbook for internal MCP manifest/runbook pattern
schema/module.schema.json for manifest fields
local /Users/pd/Developer/zenbox-wordpress prototype files copied into scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp

Canary status: missing - full 3+3 should run before merge because this touches `modules/`, compose, and a security-sensitive MCP surface. ## Canary Context Pack ### Product story Iskra/OpenClaw needs a platform-managed MCP surface for Piotr's self-hosted WordPress and Zenbox hosting. The goal is read-all guidance for WordPress/plugin settings, draft operations, and bounded WP-CLI/SFTP inspection without handing Iskra arbitrary shell access or public exposure. ### What changed - Adds `scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/` as a self-contained Python MCP service with Dockerfile, tests, and runtime docs. - Adds `zenbox-wordpress-mcp` to `compose/apps/compose.yaml` as an internal-only `integrations` profile service. - Adds `modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml`, runbook, and module index entry. ### Why it changed The local MCP prototype is now ready to become a normal platform/OpenClaw component. Keeping it in platform makes the initial deployment self-contained while the separate `zenbox-wordpress` repo has no Forgejo remote yet. ### Files touched - `compose/apps/compose.yaml` - `modules/INDEX.yaml` - `modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/*` - `scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/*` ### Relevant context - Secrets expected from Infisical path `/home-platform/apps/openclaw/zenbox-wordpress`. - Runtime target is vps1000/OpenClaw, internal-only MCP, streamable HTTP on port 8000. - Zenbox SSH host key is fail-closed by default; runtime must seed known_hosts or intentionally set `ZENBOX_SSH_ACCEPT_NEW_HOST_KEY=1` only for bootstrap. ### Runtime evidence No production runtime mutation performed. Local verification: - `tests/validate-schema.sh zenbox-wordpress-mcp` -> PASS - `PYTHONPATH=control-plane python3 -m platformctl.cli validate modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml` -> ok true - `uv sync --extra dev && uv run --project . python -m pytest` in `scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp` -> 10 passed - `uv run python -m zenbox_wordpress_mcp.server --healthcheck` in copied MCP -> ok true, no secrets emitted - Python YAML parse/assertion for `compose/apps` `zenbox-wordpress-mcp` service slice -> OK Not run: - Docker image build on Mac: Docker daemon/socket unavailable locally. - Full `docker compose config --quiet` for the entire large `compose/apps/compose.yaml`: existing repo-wide env gaps produce unrelated blank-label/proto errors before this new service can be isolated. New service slice was parsed and asserted directly. ### Known constraints - This is security-sensitive because it introduces a private-assistant MCP surface with WordPress draft capability and Zenbox SSH/SFTP credentials. - Publishing and mutating WP-CLI remain disabled by default and require explicit runtime flags plus confirmation strings. - Read-all plugin/settings tools redact credential-like option values. ### Explicit out-of-scope - No runtime deployment, no OpenClaw MCP registration change, no Infisical ACL mutation, no DNS/Substack/Yoast automation. - No creation of a separate Forgejo repo for `zenbox-wordpress`; codex has no admin permission to create `pdurlej/zenbox-wordpress`. ### Requested decision Review as Full/security-sensitive. If accepted, merge this as the platform-managed service definition, then deploy/register it in a separate operator-gated runtime step. ### Merge blockers - Any raw secret in repo. - Any public/tailnet exposure without explicit operator decision. - Any unguarded publish/mutation path. - Docker build failure on a machine with a running Docker daemon. ## Spec sources read - `AGENTS.md` instructions provided in-thread - `docs/forgejo-agent-operations.md` implied by Forgejo PR protocol from AGENTS - `compose/apps/compose.yaml` existing MCP/service patterns - `modules/openclaw-searxng-mcp/module.yaml` and runbook for vps1000/OpenClaw manifest pattern - `modules/storage-ro-mcp/module.yaml` and runbook for internal MCP manifest/runbook pattern - `schema/module.schema.json` for manifest fields - local `/Users/pd/Developer/zenbox-wordpress` prototype files copied into `scripts/zenbox-wordpress-mcp`

codex added 1 commit

2026-05-19 10:01:31 +02:00

feat(openclaw): add zenbox wordpress mcp

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0a485f86c1

codex added the

class/security-sensitive

labels

2026-05-19 10:01:43 +02:00

codex added 1 commit

2026-05-24 08:06:01 +02:00

fix(openclaw): harden zenbox wordpress mcp safety

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d6fd87b817

codex commented

2026-05-24 08:09:46 +02:00

Author

Collaborator

Fork F safety review update — 2026-05-24

Role: executor
Status: fixed and green

I reviewed this runtime/security PR before merge and pushed commit d6fd87b to harden the MCP boundary:

blocked raw wp option get/list via the generic WP-CLI passthrough; option reads now go through redacted tools only;
made wordpress_update_draft refuse non-draft posts, preventing accidental unpublish-by-update;
expanded SFTP sensitive-file denylist for backup/key/wp-config variants;
updated README safety notes and added regression tests.

Validation:

uv run --extra dev pytest → 13 passed
PYTHONPATH=control-plane python3 -m platformctl.cli validate --strict-v2 modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml → ok
docker compose -f compose/apps/compose.yaml config --no-interpolate --services | rg '^zenbox-wordpress-mcp$' → present
Forgejo required checks on head d6fd87b → success

No production deploy or runtime mutation performed.

## Fork F safety review update — 2026-05-24 **Role:** executor **Status:** fixed and green I reviewed this runtime/security PR before merge and pushed commit `d6fd87b` to harden the MCP boundary: - blocked raw `wp option get/list` via the generic WP-CLI passthrough; option reads now go through redacted tools only; - made `wordpress_update_draft` refuse non-draft posts, preventing accidental unpublish-by-update; - expanded SFTP sensitive-file denylist for backup/key/wp-config variants; - updated README safety notes and added regression tests. Validation: - `uv run --extra dev pytest` → 13 passed - `PYTHONPATH=control-plane python3 -m platformctl.cli validate --strict-v2 modules/zenbox-wordpress-mcp/module.yaml` → ok - `docker compose -f compose/apps/compose.yaml config --no-interpolate --services | rg '^zenbox-wordpress-mcp$'` → present - Forgejo required checks on head `d6fd87b` → success No production deploy or runtime mutation performed.