test(agent-access): cover signal cleanup path #90
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pdurlej/platform!90
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Delete branch "codex/issues/79-signal-cleanup-test"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Canary status: approve_merge — 6/6 reviewers OK on
cbf04d7720476a760c061456857c6d5d3d1f182d; weak-signaltimeimport finding is false-positive (timeis imported at line 11).Canary Context Pack
Product story
Security-sensitive agent access work should not rely on prose claims when a small regression test can prove the behavior. PR #84 shipped the cleanup hardening; this follow-up locks the signal cleanup path that canary asked to see directly.
What changed
Adds one focused test that starts the Codex OpenClaw ssh-agent wrapper, blocks it during the post-start fingerprint check, sends SIGTERM and SIGINT in separate parametrized runs, and verifies the wrapper kills the dedicated ssh-agent and does not leak private-key material to output or runtime files.
Why it changed
PR #84 canary produced a product dissent: the PR claimed SIGINT/SIGTERM use the same cleanup path, but the direct evidence was missing. #84 was merged before this extra test landed on main, so this PR carries only the missing regression test.
Files touched
control-plane/platformctl/tests/test_agent_access_ssh_agent.pyRelevant context
Runtime evidence
PYTHONPATH=control-plane pytest -q control-plane/platformctl/tests/test_agent_access_ssh_agent.py->10 passedPYTHONPATH=control-plane pytest -q control-plane/platformctl/tests->166 passedgit diff --check origin/main...HEAD-> passKnown constraints
The test uses disposable fake OpenSSH tools only. It does not use a real OpenClaw private key, Forgejo PAT, Infisical secret value, or live VPS SSH session.
Explicit out-of-scope
Requested decision
Approve merge if canary confirms this test closes the direct-evidence gap without introducing new security/process risk.
Merge blockers
Spec sources read
AGENTS.md— security-sensitive lane, canary, identity and PR body requirements.control-plane/platformctl/tests/test_agent_access_ssh_agent.py— test harness and fake OpenSSH tool pattern.scripts/agent-access/codex-openclaw-ssh-agent— behavior under test from #84 continuation.Refs #79
Refs #83
Follow-up to #84
48f2dab309cbf04d7720Canary iteration 2:
approve_mergeoncbf04d7720476a760c061456857c6d5d3d1f182d. 6/6 reviewers OK.Local evidence before canary: focused test
10 passed, fullplatformctl/tests166 passed,git diff --checkpass, secret-pattern scan pass.Weak-signal note:
Missing time importis a false positive;timeis imported incontrol-plane/platformctl/tests/test_agent_access_ssh_agent.pyline 11 and is used by_wait_for_file. Low timing-margin comments are non-blocking under the approved canary result.