docs(secrets): record Honcho Redis argv leak closure #441
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pdurlej/platform!441
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Delete branch "codex/w4c/honcho-redis-argv-leak-prep"
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Canary status: missing — metadata-only report PR; rely on required Forgejo checks before merge
Canary Context Pack
Product story
#124 blocks safe Honcho Redis cataloging because agents should not need to print or inspect command argv that contains a raw Redis password. Fork C verified the current runtime no longer has that raw argv leak and records the evidence without exposing the secret.
What changed
state/reports/w4c-honcho-redis-argv-leak-2026-05-24.mdwith metadata-only runtime evidence.state/cycle/W4-secrets-access-hardening-output.mdto record Fork C's finding.Why it changed
The current desired state already uses
$$REDIS_PASSWORDrather than embedding the value in compose command text, and RS2000 runtime now confirmsConfig.Cmddoes not contain the password value. This PR closes the evidence gap instead of making an unnecessary runtime change.Files touched
state/reports/w4c-honcho-redis-argv-leak-2026-05-24.mdstate/cycle/W4-secrets-access-hardening-output.mdRelevant context
modules/honcho-redis/module.yamlresidual riskredis-password-env-var-interimRuntime evidence
Read-only RS2000 metadata checks only:
cmd_contains_redis_password_value=falsecmd_has_literal_env_ref=trueunauth_ping_rejected=trueauthenticated_ping_ok=trueusingREDISCLI_AUTH, notredis-cli -ahome-platform-honcho-redis-1,home-platform-honcho-api-1, andhome-platform-honcho-deriver-1are running and healthy with restartCount0Known constraints
The Redis password still exists in the container environment. That is tracked as
redis-password-env-var-interimand should be handled as a separate Infisical-rendered config-file delivery task if the operator wants to remove container-env exposure later.Explicit out-of-scope
docker inspectenv or rendered compose output.Requested decision
Merge this evidence PR and close #124. #100 can now verify Honcho Redis persistence mode without exposing the credential through
Config.Cmd.Merge blockers
Any concern that the metadata-only evidence is insufficient, or any accidental secret disclosure.
Spec sources read
compose/apps/compose.yaml— current Honcho Redis command shapemodules/honcho-redis/module.yaml— existing residual risk statementmodules/honcho-redis/runbook.md— recovery/smoke contextstate/cycle/W4-secrets-access-hardening-output.md— W4 sequencing after ADR-0024Closes #124
Integrator note: this fork output has been consolidated into #443.
Please merge #443 instead of this PR. Keeping this PR open temporarily as fallback/source evidence until #443 lands.
Pull request closed